Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 2 Issue 2 - March 1960

Article 1

3-1960

The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of
Court-Martial Jurisdiction
Robert D. Duke
Howard S. Vogel

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert D. Duke and Howard S. Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of CourtMartial Jurisdiction, 13 Vanderbilt Law Review 435 (1960)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol13/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
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LAW REVIEW

MARCH, 1960

Num~m 2

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STANDING ARMY:
ANOTHER PROBLEM OF COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
ROBERT D. DUKE* AND HOWARD S. VOGEL**

With the emergence of the Soviet menace after World War II, the
United States has, for the first time in its history, found it essential
to maintain, both here and abroad, a large standing armed force in
what is technically peace-time. That has in turn brought to the fore
important and novel questions concerning the jurisdiction which
courts-martial may constitutionally exercise. With millions of Americans serving and likely to serve in the armed forces, it is to be
expected that the Supreme Court will scrutinize, with more care
than ever before, legislation which purports to strip from these
"citizen soldiers" fundamental rights guaranteed to civilians under
the Constitution.
One constitutional problem which seems never to have been
squarely presented to the Court is whether Congress may authorize
courts-martial to try, in time of peace, a capital or non-capital crime
committed by a serviceman within the United States, where the
nature of the crime is exclusively "civil" in the sense that its commission does not have any substantial adverse effect upon the maintenance of military discipline. Before turning to that problem, however,
it will be helpful to review the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
in which it has refused to permit enlargement of the peace-time jurisdiction of courts-martial over civilians.
I. JURISDICTION OF COURTS-MuARTIAL OVER CIVILIANS
In 1955 the Supreme Court decided United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles.' There, the Court struck down the attempt of the Air Force
* LL.B., Yale Law School 1950; member, New York Bar; Captain, Judge
Advocate General's Corps-U.S. Army Reserve. Associate, Cravath, Swaine
& Moore, New York City.
** LL.B., Columbia University 1957; member, New York Bar, United States
Court of Military Appeals. Member of the staff and faculty, The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.
This article grew out of discussions with Major Robert M. Mummey, a member of the faculty of the Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Department of the Army or any other agency
of the federal government.
1. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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to try by court-martial a former airman who had received an honorable discharge five months prior to his initial arrest on charges of
murder and conspiracy to commit murder while serving as an airman in Korea. Two years later, a majority of the Supreme Court,
2
reversing its prior decision in the same case, held in Reid v. Covert
that courts-martial lacked jurisdiction to try, in time of peace, civilian
dependents of servicemen for capital crimes committed outside the
United States while such dependents were "accompanying the armed
forces." In each of those cases, the Court, dwelling at length on the
sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury,3 declared unconstitutional a statute enacted by Congress which expressly authorized the
exercise of the very jurisdiction which the court-martial had attempted to invoke.4 And in Toth, the Court observed that: "It is
impossible to think that the discipline of the Army is going to be disrupted, its morale impaired, or its orderly processes disturbed, by giving ex-servicemen the benefit of a civilian court trial when they are
actually civilians." 5
On January 18, 1960, the Supreme Court handed down its decisions
in four cases which raised questions left unanswered in Covert, i.e.,
whether overseas court-martial jurisdiction could be sustained with
respect to (a) non-capital offenses committed by civilian dependents
or (b) capital or non-capital offenses committed by civilian employees
2. 354 U.S. 1 (1957), reversing on rehearing 351 U.S. 487 (1956), and
Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956). Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
voted to deny court-martial jurisdiction but wrote separate concurring
opinions limiting their view to capital cases only. Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Douglas and Brennan joined in Justice Black's opinion which extended to both capital and noncapital cases.
3. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, supra note 1, at 17-19; Reid v.
Covert, note 2 supra,at 7-11, 21-23, 29-32, 37.
4. Both of these statutes formed part of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which was adopted in 1950. In the Toth case, the relevant statute provided as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of article 43, any person charged with having
committed, while in a status in which he was subject to this code, an
offense against this code, punishable by confinement of five years or
more and for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United
States . .

. ,

shall not be relieved from amenability to trial by courts-

martial by reason of the termination of said status." UCMJ, Article 3 (a),
now codified in 10 U.S.C. § 803 (a) (1958).
In Reid v. Covert, the statute in question provided:
"The following persons are subject to this code

"(1

Subject to the provision of any treaty or agreement to which the
United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying
the armed forces without the continental limits of the United States.
UCMJ, art. 2(11), now codified in 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1958).
The former statute represented an innovation, but the grant of jurisdiction
found in the latter had traditionally appeared in American articles of war.
5. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, supra note 1, at 22.
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of the armed services. 6 In each instance (though by differing votes),
the Court held that courts-martial cannot constitutionally exercise
such jurisdiction over persons who do not have a "status" as members
of the armed forces.
All these decisions can be viewed as logical, albeit far-reaching,
extensions of basic constitutional doctrine that persons who are not
actually "in" the armed forces are not to be deprived of the rights
guaranteed to them by the Constitution. That doctrine was first announced in Ex parte Milligan,7 where the Supreme Court held that a
military commission convened in Indiana was without jurisdiction
under martial law8 to try a civilian resident of that State for various offenses in the nature of treason. It found later expression
in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,9 holding that trial of civilians by military
tribunals in Hawaii could not be sustained under an executive proclamation of martial law pursuant to authority granted by Congress. The
rationale of the Toth and Covert line of cases, however, departed from
that relied on in both Milligan and Duncan, where the Court had
noted that the crimes alleged could have been tried, in accordance
with civil procedures, in loyal civilian courts whose doors remained
open. In the Toth and Covert group, Congress had not provided any
means, other than trial by court-martial, for the punishment of crimes
committed abroad by civilian dependents, civilian employees or discharged servicemen. 10 As a consequence, the holdings there neces6. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (civilian
dependent charged with a non-capital offense); McElroy v. United States ex
rel. Guagliardo and Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian em-

ployees charged with non-capital offenses); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
(1960) (civilian employee charged with a capital offense). In these cases,
Mr. Justice Clark, who had dissented in Covert, joined with the four justices
who comprised the majority in Covert. Justices Whittaker and Stewart, who
had not participated in Covert, joined with the majority in Kinsella v. Singleton but dissented in the other three cases involving civilian employees. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan adhered to the capital-noncapital dichotomy
which they presented in Covert.
7. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Cf. Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144
(No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
8. At the time of Milligan's trial by military commission in 1864, there was
still in effect a presidential proclamation (without statutory authority) of 1862
which prescribed such trials for "all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and
abettors within the United States, and all persons discouraging voluntary
enlistments resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording
aid and comfort to enemies of the United States." See Ex parte Milligan,
supra note 7, at 15-16. The Court did not, however, specifically address itself
to the effect of this proclamation.
9. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
10. Congress may constitutionally provide, however, that such persons be
tried by the federal district courts. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21 (1955). See also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69,
73-74 (1941); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922); Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 211-212 (1890). For a discussion of the practical
difficulties inherent in such a solution, see dissenting opinion of Justice
Clark in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 87-89 (1957); Grisham v. Taylor, 161 F.
Supp. 112 (M.D. Pa. 1958); Note, 71 HARv. L. REv. 712 (1958); 56 MICH. L. REv.
287 (1957); Note, 107 U. or PA. L. REv. 270 (1958).
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sarily meant that the crimes in question would go unpunished by
American courts." In short, the Supreme Court held that constitutional rights do not depend on the availability of a civil forum for
the trial of crimes.
II.

THE SUPREIVIE

COURT AND

THE SERVICEMAN'S

RIGHT

TO A FAIR TRIAL

Whether or not justified by proper construction of the Constitution,
the blunt fact is that the Supreme Court's solicitude for those not
actually serving in the armed forces has not been matched by comparable concern for servicemen charged with criminal offenses. In a
number of early decisions, the Court developed the rule that, in a
collateral proceeding brought in the federal courts by a soldier or
sailor convicted by court-martial, the inquiry would be restricted to
the issues of whether (a) the court-martial had jurisdiction over the
person of accused 2 and over the offense charged 3 and (b) the sentence imposed was within the power of the court-martial 14 The
Court shut its eyes to all questions bearing on the fairness of the proceedings resulting in the accused's conviction. 15 This restrictive view
of its control over courts-martial led the Court to declare in dicta
that not only did the Bill of Rights not apply to persons in the military
service, but also that "to those in the military or naval service of the
16
United States the military law is due process."'
Since those decisions the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the
area of permissible collateral attack against criminal convictions by
state, as well as federal, courts.' 7 In addition to relaxation of pro11. Americans who commit offenses on foreign soil may be tried by the
courts of the country in which the offense is committed. See Reid v. Covert,

supra note 1. Cf. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
12. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); In re Craig, 70 Fed. 969 (C.C.D. Kan.
1895); United States ex tel. Viscardi v. MacDonald, 265 Fed. 695 (E.D.N.Y.
1920).
13. Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65

(1857).

14. Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S.

696 (1881). Additionally, the Court would consider the question of whether
there had been an illegal delegation of the power to pass on sentence. Bishop
v. United States, 197 U.S. 334 (1905).
15. In Ex parte Reed, supra note 12, at 23, Mr. Justice Swayne stated the
general rule: "The court had jurisdiction over the person and the case.
It is the organism provided by law and clothed with the duty of administering
justice in this class of cases. Having had such jurisdiction, its proceedings
cannot be collaterally impeached for any mere error or irregularity, if there
were such, committed within the sphere of its authority."
16. Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911).
17. The original view was that "mere errors in point of law, however
serious, committed by a criminal court in the exercise of its jurisdiction over
a case properly subject to its cognizance, cannot be reviewed by habeas
corpus. That writ cannot be employed as a substitute for the writ of error."
McMicking v. Schields, 238 U.S. 99, 106-07 (1915). To the same effect, see, e.g.,
Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S. 219, 229 (1914); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184
(1899); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 105 (1898). Commencing with
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cedural rules, the concept of "due process" itself has been further
refined, with the result that persons charged with crimes have enjoyed
the benefit of new safeguards against arbitrary exercise of governmental power. 18 While these developments have been taking place in
the civilian sphere, the Supreme Court has given only faint indications of changes in the rules applicable to military accused. 19 In its
most recent decision involving a collateral attack on a serviceman's
conviction by court-martial, the Supreme Court went no further than
to announce that it will require the military reviewing authorities to
give "fair consideration" to the accused's claims with respect to matters (such as brutality, coerced confessions and the like) affecting
the fairness of the trial.20 Beyond this, Reid v. Covert suggests that
four members of the Supreme Court apparently now regard the
applicability of the Bill of Rights to courts-martial as an unsettled
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938), the Supreme Court enlarged
the meaning of the term "jurisdiction" far beyond formal requirements, with
the result that jurisdiction was held to have been lost through denial of the
defendant's constitutional rights. Moreover, the Court has granted the writ
in cases where the alleged denial of constitutional rights had been raised at
the trial and decided adversely to the defendant. See Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Pollak, Proposals to

Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners: Collateral Attack On
the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50 (1956); Note, 55 COLum. L. REV. 196 (1955);
Note, 61 HARv. L. REV. 657 (1948).
18. For example, the Supreme Court has held the following to constitute
denials of fundamental rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution:

(1) The court and jury were subject to mob domination, Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923); (2) the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony,
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); (3) the defendant did not intelligently waive counsel in a prosecution before a federal court, Johnson v.
Zerbst, supra note 17; (4) the defendant's plea of guilty was coerced, Waley v.
Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); (5) the defendant did not intelligently waive
the right to trial by jury in a prosecution before a federal court, United States
ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 320 U.S. 220 (1943); and (6) the defendant was
denied the right to consult with counsel, Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945);
House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
19. As late as 1950, the Supreme Court in Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103,
reaffirmed the traditional doctrine concerning the scope of inquiry of civil
courts in habeas corpus proceedings involving military tribunals. See notes
14-16 supra. Cf. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950).
20. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 144 (1953) (opinion by Vinson, C.J. in
which Justices Reed, Burton and Clark concurred). In Easley v. Hunter, 209
F.2d 483, 487 (10th Cir. 1953), Burns v. Wilson was interpreted as holding
"that a military court must consider questions relating to the guarantees
afforded an accused by the Constitution and when this is done, the civil
courts will not review its action." Accord, Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317
(10th Cir. 1957); Dixon v. United States, 237 F.2d 509 (10th Cir. 1956); Suttles
v. Davis, 215 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 903 (1954). It is
possible, however, to interpret Burns v. Wilson as laying the groundwork for
future review by federal courts of the basic fairness of military procedures.
Thus, in Day v. Wilson, 247 F.2d 60, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1957), the Court of Appeals
held, citing Burns v. Wilson, that the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
and determine a claim that petitioner was denied basic constitutional rights.
Cf. Day v. Davis, 235 F.2d 379, 384 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
881 (1956). Note, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1043, 1053 (1957); Note, 67 HARv. L. REv.

479, 483 (1954); Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 413, 422, n. 48 (1956).
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question. 1 The Court has also held, in Lee v. Madigan,2 that an Article of War making the capital crimes of murder and rape punishable
by court-martial only in time of war was entitled to a liberal reading
in favor of the accused.
It should not, of course, be supposed that the serviceman, having
been abandoned by the federal courts, has been left to the mercies
of his military commander. The Uniform Code of Military Justice,
enacted by Congress in 1950, cloaks the military accused with protections which compare very favorably with those accorded the civilian
defendant in the federal courts.23 Whether the military accused
should regard himself as more fortunate than his civilian counterpart
is, however, beside the point for present purposes. The fundamental
question to be explored here is whether Congress may, consistently
with the Constitution, grant to courts-martial the power to try servicemen for exclusively "civil" offenses committed in time of peace
within the United States.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR COURTS-MARTIAL JURISDICTION

Several provisions of article I of the Constitution confer on Congress the power to legislate with respect to the armed forces. Section
8, clause 14, of that article provides expressly that Congress may
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces." Clauses 12 and 13 empower Congress to "raise and
support Armies" and to "provide for the common Defense and general Welfare." Finally, clause 18-the necessary and proper clauseprovides that Congress may "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to carry into execution those and other powers
granted to it. Clauses 12 and 13, however, have never been thought
to support the assertion, in peacetime, of court-martial jurisdiction
over members of the armed forces. On the other hand, the necessary
and proper clause seems plainly applicable in determining the permissible limits of such jurisdiction over servicemen. 24
21. 354 U.S. 1, 37. See note 2 supra.

22. 358 U.S. 228 (1959).

23. For an excellent summary of the rights which a serviceman has today
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, see Weiner, Courts-Martialand
the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice,72 HARv. L. REv. 266, 294-98 (1958).
24. In the Covert line of cases, supra notes 2 and 6, the Court took the position that the necessary and proper clause was not available to support peacetime jurisdiction over persons who were not actually "in" the land or naval
forces within the meaning of clause 14, reasoning that the necessary and
proper clause was available only in aid of jurisdiction exercised within the
permissible limits of clause 14. The necessary implication of this reasoning
is, of course, that, as to the persons "in" the armed forces, clause 14 must
be read in the light of the necessary and proper clause. Cf. Mr. Justice
Clark's observation in Kinsella v. Singleton, supra note 6, that "if civilian
dependents are included in the term 'land and naval forces' at all, they are
subject to the full power granted the Congress to create capital as well as
noncapital offenses." 361 U.S. at 246.
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The Bill of Rights contains only one reference to the armed forces.
The Fifth Amendment provides that
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous

crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in

cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger ....

None of the other guarantees of the Bill of Rights is expressly made
inapplicable to the armed forces. That apparent gap has recently
given rise to a spirited controversy with regard to the original intent
of those who prepared the Bill of Rights.25 Although ordinary rules
of construction readily permit an argument that the rights set forth
in the sixth amendment (trial by petit jury, assistance of counsel,
etc.) extend to cases arising in the land or naval forces, 26 it seems
quite clear that the practice following the adoption of the Bill of
Rights never conformed to that construction.27 The legislative history
of the adoption of the Bill of Rights reflects, if nothing else, a failure
to grapple with the fundamental problem of reconciling the rights of
the individual with the special requirements of the military establishment. As previously noted, the problem may still remain open
for judicial consideration despite prior decisions suggesting that servicemen could claim none of the guarantees found in the Bill of
Rights.2
In any case, putting the Bill of Rights to one side, the power
granted by clause 14 seems on its face to be plenary with respect to
the trial and punishment of offenses committed by persons who are
actually members of the armed forces. Yet, there is, to put it mildly,
grave doubt whether the constitutional convention ever believed that
courts-martial could be allowed to displace American civil courts as
the instrument for punishing offenses having no special relationship
to enforcement of military discipline. The evolution of the courtmartial and the eighteenth century understanding of its proper jurisdictional sphere support that view.
1. The Court-Martialin England.-Although the precise origin of
the court-martial in England is obscure, it is clear that at a very early
25. See Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding,71 HA.v. L. REV. 293 (1957), for the position that the Bill of
Rights was intended to apply to those in the land and naval forces. For the
opposite position, see Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The
OriginalPractice,72 Hsav. L. REv. 1, 266 (1958).
26. The argument is expounded at length in Henderson, supra note 25.
Among other things, it is hard to construe the explicit exception in the fifth
amendment as being applicable to the sixth amendment, which commences
with a reference to "all" criminal prosecutions. Yet even Henderson concedes that military trials were not to be subject to the petit jury requirements.

27. This is made clear in Colonel Weiner's exhaustive survey of the pro-

cedures used in trials by court-martial in the three decades following the
adoption of the Bill of Rights. See Weiner, supra note 25, at 27-36.
28. See text at notes 20-21 supra.
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date the Kings of England commenced the practice of promulgating
ordinances of war to govern the troops raised to fight foreign and
domestic wars.29 These ordinances-the forerunners of the articles
of war-were ad hoc in nature, being limited in duration to the particular war then being fought. 30 Although the traditional view has
been that originally the Court of Chivalry (also known as the Court
of the Constable and the Marshall) had jurisdiction over military
offenses, 31 it now appears rather more likely that military justice was
dispensed in summary fashion by various officers (including the Lord
High Constable and the Earl Marshall) of the army whom the Crown
commissioned for the purpose.32 At all events, by the seventeenth
century it had become well-established that in time of war the Crown
had the prerogative power to adopt articles of war governing the
33
army.
A

29. BRITISH WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAw 7
TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
30. SQUIBB, HIGH COURT OF CHIVALRY 3-5 (1959).

(7th ed. 1929); DAVIS,
339-41 (2d ed. 1901).

31. "The Court of the Constable and the Marshall was concerned primarily
with the discipline of the army, and matters related thereto." 1 HowDswoRH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 573 (3d ed. 1922). See also ADYE, A TREATISE ON
COURTS MARTIAL 11 (8th ed. 1810); HALE, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE
Com-mWoN LAW OF ENGLAND 34 (4th ed. 1792); MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 266 (1908); BRrTSH WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY

7-8 (7th ed. 1929). This view was recently echoed in Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 25 n. 44 (1957).
Holdsworth's belief that military discipline was enforced by this court
was predicated on Sir Matthew Hale's statement that "the constable and
marshal had ... a judicial power, or a court wherein several matters were
determinable: . . . Thirdly, the offenses and miscarriages of soldiers contrary
to the laws and rules of the army; for always preparatory to an actual war,
the Kings of this realm, by advice of the constable and marshal were used
to compose a book of rules and orders, for the due order and discipline of
their officers and soldiers." HALE, op. cit. supra note 31, at 34.
32. See SQUIBB, op. cit. supra note 30, ch. 1. The author (who was counsel
in a case actually decided by the Court of Chivalry in 1954, after it had fallen
into desuetude for nearly two centuries) concludes that the court's jurisdiction mainly embraced various non-criminal matters, some of which were contractual in nature while others involved rights in the use of coats of arms.
Moreover, the court's procedure, like that of the admiralty courts, followed
the rules of the civil law. Although at one time the court did exercise jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by Englishmen abroad, none of the
surviving records of the court indicates that it had any disciplinary powers
over soldiers, either in England or elsewhere. Apparently the confusion arose
in part because of a faulty translation of "Curia Militaris" and in part because of the mistaken assumption that the Lord High Constable and the Earl
Marshall exercised, through the Court of Chivalry, the disciplinary powers
which they unquestionably had under various articles of war. Cf. Hale's
statement that "the military court held before the Constable and Marshal
anciently, as the Judices Oridinarrii in this case, or otherwise before the
King's Commissioners of that jurisdiction as Judices Delegati," which indicates that many officers other than the Lord High Constable and Earl Marshall
dispensed military justice. HALE, op. cit supra note 31, at 33.
33. See An Act Declaring the King's Sole Right over the Militia, 1661, 13
Car. 2, c. 6; Barwis v. Keppel, 2 Wilson's Rep. 314, 95 Eng. Rep. 831 (1766).
This prerogative power was an incident of what Blackstone called the King's
position "as the generalissimo, or the first in military command within the
kingdom." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262. Blackstone explicitly stated
that "the sole supreme government and command of the militia within all
his majesty's realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land . . .
LAW
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Until the reign of Charles I, the practice of trying soldiers before
military tribunals seems to have passed without objection by Parliament, presumably because these trials were for the most part held in
time of war.34 Charles I, however, issued commissions for the enforcement of military law against soldiers and sailors in time of peace. This
promptly drew Parliamentary fire, for in its famous Petition of Right
addressed to the Crown in 1627, Parliament complained that soldiers
and mariners had been tried by military commissions, proceeding
under martial (i.e., military) 35 law, for "murder, robbery, felony,
mutiny or other outrage or misdemeanor" and prayed that the pracor put
tice be halted "lest ... your Majesty's subjects be destroyed,
36
land.1
the
of
franchise
and
laws
the
to
contrary
to death
The standing army which had first been established during the
37
Both
Protectorate continued in existence after the Restoration.
issued
power,
Charles II and James II, relying on the prerogative
38
It is worth noting
articles of war for the government of their troops.
that the articles issued by James II in 1686 prohibited the infliction,
39
in time of peace, of any punishment amounting to loss of life or limb.
the
The articles of James II did, however, punish by court-martial
40
commission by soldiers of various civil crimes, such as theft.
Contemporaneously with the accession of William and Mary to the
throne in 1689, Parliament adopted the Declaration of Right, which
41
One
later that year was revised and enacted as the Bill of Rights.
ever was and is the undoubted right of his majesty, and his royal predecessors,
kings and queens of England ..... " Ibid. Blackstone's observations were, of
course, made on the assumption that a standing army in peace-time would
be subject to Parliamentary control.
34. Attempts were made from time to time, especially during the reigns
of the Tudors, to enforce military law under the prerogative power of the
crown in time of peace, but these attempts were never countenanced by the
law of England. See generally 1 HoLnswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw
574-75 (3d ed. 1922); MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
266-67 (1908); HALE, Op. cit. supra note 31, at 35.

35. In the seventeenth century the term "martial law" referred to what
is now called "military law." That usage is reflected in Hale's discussion of
the subject.
36. Petition of Right, 1627, 3 Car. 1, c. 1.
37. Taxation, 1660, 12 Car. 2, cc. 9, 10; Disbanding of the Army, 1660, 12 Car.
2, c. 15; Taxation, 1660, 12 Car. 2, cc. 20, 27-28. Under these statutes Charles
II was enabled to maintain not only garrisons in certain fortified places but
also some of the regiments which had aided in his restoration. See generally
MANUAL OF MIITARY LAW 10-11 (7th ed. 1929).
38. BRITISH WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAw 10-11 (7th ed. 1929).
39. Articles of War of James II, art. LXIV, reprinted in WINTHROP, MILITARY

LAW AND PRECEDENTs appendix V, 1434, 1445 (1896).
40. Articles of War of James II, art. XVIII, reprinted in WINTHROP, op. cit.
supra note 39, at appendix V, 1434, 1437. Similarly, the articles previously
issued by Charles II in 1662 expressly reserved from the jurisdiction of
courts-martial offenses involving the death penalty. BRITISH WAR OFFICE,
MANUAL OF ILITARY LAw 10 (7th ed. 1929).

41. Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W.&M., c. 2. The Declaration of Right had been

agreed to by Parliament on February 12, 1689, and was presented to William

and Mary the next day, when they were proclaimed King and Queen of
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of the most striking features of this famous document was the bold
pronouncement that standing armies in peace-time were unlawful
without the consent of Parliament. Thus, at one stroke the royal
power to raise peace-time armies was severed and control over the
army passed into the hands of Parliament.
In the same year, with its adoption of the first Mutiny Act,42
Parliament extended its newly-won control over the army by legislating with respect to the punishment of military offenses-an area
previously reserved to the Crown. The preamble of that act contained
this ringing declaration of the supremacy of civil procedures over
military law:
Whereas the raising or keeping a standing Army within the Kingdome
in time of peace unless it be with the consent of Parlyament is against
Law...
And whereas noe man may be forejudged of Life or Limbe, or subjected to any kind of punishment by Martiall Law, or in any other manner
than by the judgement of his Peeres and according to the Known and
Established Laws of this Realme...
The act went on to provide for trial by court-martial, in time of peace,
of the three offenses of mutiny, sedition and desertion, and authorized
the death penalty for soldiers committing any of those offenses. Parliament was, however, careful to make clear that in other respects
soldiers remained subject to "the ordinary processes of Law."
The Mutiny Act did not supersede the Crown's prerogative power
to adopt, in time of war, articles of war which prescribed the death
penalty or lesser punishments. 43 Moreover, in 1712 Parliament authorized the Crown, in time of peace, to adopt articles of war applicable in
the dominions or elsewhere outside England and to constitute courtsmartial "in such manner as might have been done by Her Majesty's
authority beyond the seas in time of war."44 It was not, however,
until 1803 that the Crown obtained statutory authority to promulgate
articles of war applicable in peace-time to troops stationed in England,
as well as abroad. 45 Ultimately, in 1813 the royal prerogative was
England. Sections IV-XIII of the Bill of Rights did not appear in the Declaration. The most important change was the addition of section XII which
related to the dispensing power.
ENGLAND

549 (5th ed. 1847);

HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF

ENGLAND 304-05 (1908).

42. Mutiny Act, 1688, 1 W.&M., c. 4 reprinted in WnTRnoP, op cit. supra

note 39, appendix VI. For a statement of the circumstances which led up to
the passage of the first Mutiny Act, see BRITISH WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF
MILITARY LAW 10, 11 (7th ed. 1929).
43. See Barwis v. Keppel, 2 Wilson's Rep. 314 95 Eng. Rep. 831 (1766),
where the Court of King's Bench held, in effect, that the articles of war there
in question had been promulgated under the Crown's continuing prerogative
power with respect to the army when engaged in war and to troops in active
service in foreign countries.
44. Mutiny Act, 1712, 12 Anne, c. 13.
45. Mutiny Act, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 20.
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completely superseded by the enactment of statutory articles which
were applicable, in time of war, in England and elsewhere.46
2. The Eighteenth Century Articles of War.-In light of this history
of stubborn Parliamentary opposition to the extension of peace-time
court-martial jurisdiction, it is not surprising that the British articles
of war in effect at the outbreak of the American Revolution 47 reflect
the plain purpose to confine the scope of courts-martial jurisdiction
to the trial and punishment of military offenses, and in other respects
to give precedence to the civil authorities. Thus, the British articles
provided:
Whenever any Officer or Soldier shall be accused of a capital Crime,
or of having used Violence against the Persons or Property of Our Sub-

jects, such as is punishable by the known Laws of the Land, the Commanding Officer and Officers of every Regiment, Troop, or Party, to
which the Person or Persons so accused shall belong, are hereby required,
upon Application duly made by or in behalf of the Party or Parties
injured, to use his utmost Endeavours to deliver over such accused
Person or Persons to the Civil Magistrate; and likewise to be aiding and
assisting to the Officers of Justice, in apprehending and securing the
Person or Persons so accused, in order to bring them to a Trial . . . 48

Any commanding officer who failed to heed that requirement was
49
subject to dismissal from the service.
More to the point, the American articles of war adopted by the
Continental Congress in 1776 contained an almost identical provision.50
Substantially the same provision also appeared in the articles of war
of 1806 51-the first completely new articles enacted by Congress after
52
ratification of the Constitution.
46. Mutiny Act, 1813, 53 Geo. 3, c. 17, § 146.
47. British Articles of War of 1765, reprinted in WiNTHaop, op. cit supra

note 39, appendix VII, 1448. Winthrop states unequivocally that the British

Articles of War of 1765 were in force at the beginning of the American
Revolution. Ibid. It is to be noted, however, that General Davis has stated

that the British Articles of War of 1774, reprinted in DAvis, op. cit. supra
note 29, at 581, were probably those from which our own articles derived.
DAvis, op. cit. supra note 29, at 340-41. An examination of the British Articles
of 1765 and 1774 reveals that the two sets of articles were substantially the
same concerning matters of discipline.
48. British Articles of War, 1765, § 11, art. 1, reprinted in WiNTHRoP, op. cit.
supra note 39, at 1446; British Articles of War, 1774, § 11, art. 1, reprinted in
DAvis, op. cit. supra,note 29, at 589.
49. Ibid.
50. Rules and Articles for the Better Government of the Troops, 1776, §
10, art. 1, reprinted in WINnmxoP, op. cit. supra note 39, at 1494. These Articles
were adopted on September 20, 1776. 5 JouR. CONT. CONG. 788 (1776).
51. Act of April 10, 1806, c. 20, § 1, art. 59, 2 Stat. 366.

52. The following is the history of the 1776 Articles: On May 31, 1786,

section XIV of the 1776 articles was repealed and replaced by a new section.
See 30 JouR. CONT. CONG. 316 (1786). In 1789, Congress continued in force
the 1776 articles, as amended. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, c. 25, § 4, 1 Stat. 96. On
three occasions prior to 1806, the 1776 articles were re-enacted "as far as the
same may be applicable to the constitution of the United States." Act of
April 30, 1790, c. 10, § 13, 1 Stat. 121; Act of March 3, 1795, c. 44, § 14, 1 Stat.
432; Act of May 30, 1796, c. 39, § 20, 1 Stat. 486. There were unsuccessful
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Of course, the objection might be raised that these provisions of
the articles of war did no more than grant to the civil authorities
priority of prosecution of civil crimes and that courts-martial could
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over them. 53 The fact is, however,
that neither the British nor the American articles of war contained
any provision which in terms denounced common-law crimes such
as murder, robbery and the like.54 It is true that those articles did

contain the so-called "general article" which gave to courts-martial
the power to punish all crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects, "to the prejudice of good order and military discipline," that
were not elsewhere proscribed in the articles. 55 In his treatise, however, Colonel Winthrop, the leading nineteenth century authority on
American military law, pointed out that the accepted construction of
the general article had been to regard the qualification "to the prejudice of good order and military discipline" as applicable to "crimes
not capital" as well as to "disorders and neglects." 56 He went on to
state that, in order for any offense to be cognizable under the general
article, the offense must have a "reasonably direct and palpable"
impact upon good order and military discipline.5 7 In support of that
view, Colonel Winthrop cited many instances where the findings and
sentence of courts-martial were overturned by higher military authorities because the offense in question was exclusively one against
the civil law. 58 Furthermore, in Ex parte Mason,59 the Supreme Court
attempts made to have Congress completely revise the 1776 articles. For
example, Secretary of War Knox in 1789 stated that it was necessary "that
the articles of war be revised and adapted to the constitution." AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS MILITARY AFFAIRS 6 (Lowrie & Clarke 1832).
53. It must be noted, however, that in seventeenth and eighteenth century
England soldiers, as well as civilians, were tried in time of peace by the
civil courts. 2 CAMVBELL, LIVES OF THE CIEF JUSTICES 91 (1849). The general
rule was "that no crime for which the common or statute laws of the county
have provided a punishment is cognizable before a court-martial." TYLER,
MILITARY LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF COURTS-MARTIL 154 (3d ed. 1814). The
army was considered amply protected by the rule that "upon proof being
brought of his conviction of a crime before the civil court which renders
him unfit for, or unworthy of, the honorable profession of a soldier, he may
on that ground be cashiered." Id. at 156.
54. See generally British Articles, 1765, reprinted in WINTHROP, op. cit. supra
note 39, at appendix VII, 1448; British Articles of War, 1774, reprinted in
DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 29, at 581.
55. British Articles of War, 1765, § XX, art. III, reprinted in WINTHROP, Op.
cit. supra note 39, at 1469; British Articles of War, 1774, § XX, Article III, reprinted in DAviS, op. cit. supra note 29, at 581.
56. WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 39, at 1123, n. 82; DAVIS, op. cit. supra note
29, at 475.
57. WINTHROP, Op. cit. supra note 39, at 1123. See also 16 Ops. ATT'Y GEN.
578 (1880) (dictum).
58. WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 39, at 1124, M. 88; DIG. Ops. JAG 68-69 TT
3 (1895). Winthrop noted, however, that in practice the general rule was
somewhat perverted by a commander's sustaining courts-martial jurisdiction
"whenever the offense can be viewed as affecting, in any material though
inferior degree, the discipline of the command." WINTHROP, Op. cit. supra
note 39, at 1125.
59. 105 U.S. 696 (1881).
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implicitly recognized the distinction between civil and military
offense in holding that a court-martial had jurisdiction under the
general article to try a soldier for the offense of assault with intent
to kill. The Court stated: "[T]he crime charged, and for which the trial
was had, was not simply an assault with intent to kill, but an assault
by a soldier on duty with intent to kill a prisoner confined in a [federal] jail over which he was standing guard. ' 60
It should also be noted that the general article in terms excluded
from its scope all capital crimes, which were, of course, considerably
more numerous in the eighteenth century than at the present time.61
3. The Historical Background of Clause 14.-The constitutional
power of Congress to make rules for the government and regulation
of the land and naval forces, as set forth in article I, section 8, clause
14, had its counterpart in the Articles of Confederation, which conferred on Congress "exclusive right and power of . . . making rules
for the government and regulation of [the] land and naval forces,
and directing their operations. ' 62
It will be observed that, by vesting power of command in the legislative branch, the Articles of the Confederation departed radically
from the contemporary practice in England. 63 After the Revolution
of 1689, Parliament had undertaken to control the establishment of
standing armies in peace-time, 64 but it had not attempted to usurp
the power of the Crown to exercise command and direction over the
65
army.
The express grant of power in clause 14 seems to have been designed to accomplish two objects. First, the omission of any reference
to power of command, in conjunction with the express grant of
authority to the President to act as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, made it clear that Congress was not to retain the power of
command which it had enjoyed under the Articles of the Confederation. Second, clause 14 reflected the plain intent to give to Congress,
not the President, the power to provide for the government and
60. Id. at 698.
61. At the end of the eighteenth century all felonies committed in England
with the exception of petty larceny and maiming were punishable by death.
Report of the Select Committee on Capital Punishment 25 (1930), reprinted
in MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINSTRATION (1940).
62. Articles of Confederation, art. IX (1781), reprinted in 2 CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1218 (1953).
63. See 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262-63.
64. Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W.&M. c. 2; Mutiny Act, 1688, 1 W.&M. c. 4.
65. The Preamble of the Act of 1661, temporarily legalizing the militia under
Charles II, declared that the "government, command, and disposition of the
militia, and of all forces by sea, . . . is, and bye the lawes of England

ever was, the undoubted right of His Majesty." An Act Declaring the King's
Sole Right over the Militia, 1661, 13 Car. 2 c. 6. That act, with the exception
of part of the Preamble, was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1863,

26 and 27 Vict. c. 125.
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regulation of the armed forces, including, of course, the punishment
of military offenses. 66
Professor Crosskey has demonstrated, convincingly and at length,
that the purpose in enumerating certain powers in article I, section 8,
was to remove the possibility that the executive branch might later
be held to possess powers which in England had been associated
with the royal prerogative.6 7 It cannot be seriously disputed that
the Constitutional Convention relied heavily on Blackstone as
the source for determining those areas in which questions concerning
the distribution of powers between the executive and legislative
branches might arise. 68 In the Commentaries, Blackstone pointed out
that the Crown retained certain prerogative powers with respect to
promulgating rules governing the army and navy.69 Clause 14 represented the judgment of the Convention that control over such rules
was better reposed in the hands of Congress than the President. 70
In this respect, the Constitution's grant of power to Congress can be
regarded as an acceleration of the British constitutional development
that culminated in 1813 with Parliament's drawing to itself the right
to enact articles of war governing all British troops at all times and
71
wherever located.
What has been said above shows that clause 14 was not expressed
in unqualified terms in order that Congress might legislate at will

-

66. It should be noted, however, that one authority in the field of military
law has recently contended that the intent of the Constitutional Convention
was to Confer power upon both Congress and the President (in cases where
Congress had not acted) to make rules for the government and regulation of
the armed forces. See Fratcher, Presidential Power to Regulate Military
Justice: A Critical Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, 34
N.Y.U. L. REV. 861-62 (1959).

This view is difficult to sustain once it be

conceded that the drafting of the Constitution was done in the light of Blackstone's Commentaries.In essence, Blackstone states that the King had "the sole
supreme government and command... of all forces by sea and land," and "the
sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMmENTAHiEs *262. In the Constitution, however, the President is only given
the "command of the Army and Navy." Art. II, § 2. By art. I, § 8, cl. 14, however, Congress is given the power "to make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces" of the United States, and by art. I,
§ 8, cl. 12, Congress is given the power "to raise and support Armies." In commenting on this constitutional dichotomy, Professor Crosskey states that "the
almost slavish following, throughout all the provisions, of Blackstone's words
-'command,' 'regulate,' 'govern'-can hardly leave a doubt as to what the
Convention was doing." 1 CROSSKEY, op. cit. supra note 62, at 425.
67. With particular reference to military powers of Congress, see 1 CRoss=s, op. cit. supra note 62, at 413-14, 424-25.
68. Thus, Justice Brewer stated that "Blackstone's Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of England. At
the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution it had been published
about twenty years, and it has been said that more copies of the work had
been sold in this country than in England, so that undoubtedly the framers of
the Constitution were familiar with it." Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65,
69 (1904). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 430-31 (Lodge ed. 1888).
69. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262-63.
70. See text at note 65 supra.
71. Mutiny Act, 1813, 54 Geo. 3, c. 25.
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with regard to members of the armed forces. The strong probability
is that the Constitutional Convention never conceived that Congress
could, much less would, attempt to grant to the military the power
to try and punish civil crimes committed in time of peace.7 2 Apart
from the fact that Parliament had never ventured to make such a
grant of power,7 3 the Convention could hardly have been unaware of
Blackstone's strong condemnation of criminal justice administered
under military procedures. He said:
When the nation was engaged in war ... some rigorous methods were
put in use for the raising of armies, and the due regulation and discipline
of the soldiery; which are to be looked upon only as temporary excrescences bred out of the distemper of the state, and not as any part of the
permanent and perpetual laws of the Kingdom. .

.

. The necessity of

order and discipline in any army is the only thing which can give it
countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of peace,
when the King's courts are open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land.74
In view of the unhappy experience of the Colonies with British martial law during the Revolution,7 5 it is even more likely that Black-

stone's views met with the whole-hearted agreement of the Constitutional Convention.
IV. THE EROSION OF CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER CIVM OFFENSES
We have noted that the 1806 articles of war faithfully reproduced

the original limitations on peace-time court-martial jurisdiction over
civil offenses. 76 It will now be instructive to trace the disappearance
of those limitations, a process which was so gradual that comparatively little attention was focused on each succeeding step.
The 1863 Statute
The first step came in 1863, when Congress, as part of a statute to
enroll and call out the national forces, expressly authorized courtsmartial to try various civil crimes, regardless of whether the circum72. The narrow jurisdiction which the military originally exercised in
peacetime has previously been discussed. See text at notes 47-59 supra.
73. Thus, when the first Mutiny Act was passed, only the military offenses
of mutiny, sedition, and desertion were proscribed. Mutiny Act, 1688, 1 W. &
M. c. 4. For a general discussion of the narrow scope of the various Mutiny
Acts, see BarrsH WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF LT=ARY LAW 11-13 (7th ed. 1929).
74. 1 BLACKSTONE, CoMAUinnIEs * 413.
REVOLuTION 1764-1788, at 91-96 (2d ed. 1929).
ucmPAC
75. MoRIsoN, THE A
In his dissenting opinion in McElroy v. Guagliardo, supra note 6, Mr. Justice
Whittaker quoted Hamilton's statement in THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 136
(Lodge ed. 1888), to the effect that the military powers granted to Congress
(i.e., clauses 12, 13 and 14) "ought to exist without limitation." Apart from
the fact that Hamilton was not attempting specifically to construe the scope
of clause 14, the burden of his argument in Nos. 23-29 of THE FEDERALIST was
addressed to the proposition that the Congress, not the state legislatures, should
have the powers conferred by clauses 12, 13 and 14.
76. See note 50 supra.
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stances of their commission prejudiced good order and military discipline. That authority was, however, applicable only "in time of war,
insurrection or rebellion," although it did have the effect of permitting
77
imposition of the death penalty.
The 1863 statute was brought before the Supreme Court in Coleman
v. Tennessee,78 where the defendant, following his conviction by courtmartial of the murder of a girl in Tennessee, argued that his subsequent conviction by the Tennessee courts of the same offense could
not be sustained because the statute was intended to vest in courtsmartial exclusive jurisdiction over civil offenses committed in time
of war or rebellion. Although the Court avoided any suggestion of
constitutional restriction on congressional power to make such jurisdiction exclusive, it nevertheless flatly rejected the defendant's argument, in stating:
Previous to its enactment, the offenses designated were punishable by
the State courts, and persons in the military service who committed them
were delivered over to those courts for trial; and it contains no words

indicating an intention on the part of Congress to take from them the
jurisdiction in this respect which they had always exercised. With the
known hostility of the American people to any interference by the military with the regular administration of justice in the civil courts, no
such intention should be ascribed to Congress in the absence of clear and
direct language to that effect.79

The Court also noted the particular problem which the statute was
designed to correct:
It was enacted not merely to insure order and discipline among the men
composing those forces, but to protect citizens not in the military service
from the violence of soldiers. It is a matter well known that the march
even of an army not hostile is often accompanied with acts of violence
and pillage by straggling parties of soldiers, which the most rigid discipline is hardly able to prevent. The offenses mentioned are those of most
common occurrence, and the swift and summary justice of a military
court was deemed necessary to restrain their commission.80

It will be observed that the Court did not intimate that peace-time
jurisdiction over civil crimes could be entrusted to courts-martial.
The 1874 Articles of War

The provisions of the 1863 statute were formally incorporated in the
articles of war of 1874.81 At the same time, the provisions of the 1806
articles requiring delivery of military offenders to the civil authorities
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Act of March 3, 1863, c. 75, § 30; Rev. Stat. § 1342, art. 58 (1875).
97 U.S. 509 (1878).
Id. at 514; 6 Ops. ATT'Y GFN'. 413, 419 (1854).
97 U.S. at 513.
Rev. Stat. § 1342, art. 58 (1875).
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were brought into line by making that requirement inapplicable in
time of war or rebellion.8 2 Thus, the 1874 articles made it clear that
in such times the military authorities having custody of an accused
were entitled to priority in prosecuting him for civil crimes.
The 1916 Articles of War
The erosion became more pronounced with the enactment of the
1916 articles of war. 83 These articles represented the first serious
attempt to revise the articles of war of 1806, to eliminate obsolete
material and to incorporate the experience gained from the administration of military justice during the nineteenth century.84 The 1916
articles made four important changes in the rules applicable to jurisdiction over civil crimes committed in peace-time within the United
States. In the first place, court-martial jurisdiction was extended to
specified non-capital civil offenses (such as larceny, robbery and
assault), whether or not committed in time of war.85 General Crowder, the then Judge Advocate General, 86 explained to the Senate
Subcommittee on Military Affairs that this extension was designed
to eliminate the confusion in pleading which had resulted from the
requirement that civil crimes be charged under the general article in
87
peace-time and under the specific article in wartime.
Second, the general article was radically altered by excising the
qualification that "crimes not capital" be to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline.88 Relying on a dictum in Grafton v.
United States,89 which actually involved the murder of two Filipinos
while the accused was performing military duties as a sentry on
post, General Crowder frankly stated that the amendment of the
general article was intended to sweep within court-martial jurisdiction all non-capital civil crimes, not elsewhere expressly denounced
by the articles.9 0 Although recognizing that there had been "some
argument" 9' 1 about the construction of the prior general article, General Crowder neither discussed the Grafton case nor brought to the
subcommittee's attention Winthrop's unequivocal view that only noncapital crimes prejudicing good order and military discipline could
be prosecuted under the prior general article.92 Also, General Crow82. Rev. Stat. § 1342, art. 59 (1875).
83. Articles of War, 1916, c. 418, 39 Stat. 650.
84. See S. REP. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 28 (1916).
85. Articles of War, 1916, art. 93, 39 Stat. 664.
86. Major General Enoch B. Crowder was The Judge Advocate General
of the Army from February 15, 1911, to February 23, 1923. See 1 C.M.R. vii
(1951).
87. S.REP. No. 130, supra note 83, at 89.
88. Articles of War, 1916, art. 96, 39 Stat. 666.
89. 206 U.S. 333, 348 (1907).
90. S.REP. No. 130, supra note 84, at 91.

91. Ibid.

92. See WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 39, at 1123, 1124 n. 82.
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der did not even advert to the reasons for enlarging the general
article to cover "all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
military service."9 3 Obviously, the commission by a serviceman of
any serious offense may, in a sense, bring discredit upon the armed
forces.
Third, the 1916 articles expressly provided that murder or rape
committed outside the United States could be tried by court-martial
in time of peace.9 4 Prior to the 1916 articles, courts-martial had no
peace-time jurisdiction over any civil capital offense. In connection
with this amendment, General Crowder, with the support of the
Secretary of War, disclosed his disagreement with the recommendation of the Army General Staff to the effect that courts-martial also
be empowered to try murder and rape committed within the United
States.95 Congress ultimately rejected the recommendation of the
96
General Staff.
Fourth, the 1916 articles further eroded the requirement for delivery
of offenders to civil authorities, notably by eliminating that requirement in cases where the soldier was being held by the army to
answer to it for a crime punishable under the articles of war.97 In
effect, therefore, the 1916 articles gave to the army priority of prosecution with respect to soldiers who were in its custody awaiting trial
by court-martial for any peace-time civil crime other than murder or
rape committed within the United States.
It is interesting that, in broadening the scope of court-martial jurisdiction, the 1916 articles provided the basis for the contention, previously considered and rejected in Coleman v. Tennessee,9 8 that
courts-martial had exclusive jurisdiction over civil crimes committed
in war-time. 99 The contention met with the same lack of success before the Supreme Court.10 0 However, none of these cases involved
the constitutional limits of congressional power to authorize courtsmartial to try civil crimes committed in peace-time. And, of course,
even the 1916 articles stopped short of permitting courts-martial to
93. Articles of War, 1916, art. 96, 39 Stat. 666.
94. Articles of War, 1916, art. 92, 39 Stat. 664.

95. S. REP. No. 130, supra note 83, at 22, 87-89. The then Secretary of War,
Lindley M. Garrison, stated that "it ought never to be embarrassing to the
military service to have exclusive jurisdiction of civil capital offenses com-

mitted within the states of the Union and the District of Columbia, by persons
subject to military law, vested in the civil courts." Id. at 22.
96. See Articles of War, 1916, art. 92, 39 Stat. 664.
97. Article of War, 1916, art. 74, 39 Stat. 662.
98. 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878).
99. This contention was advanced and rejected in United States v. Hirsch,
254 Fed. 109 (E.D.N.Y. 1918); People v. Denman, 179 Cal. 497, 177 P. 461
(1918); Ex parte Koester, 56 Cal. App. 621, 206 P. 116 (1922); Funk v. State,
84 Tex. Cr. 402, 208 S.W. 509 (1919). The contention was upheld in Ex parte
King, 246 Fed. 868 (E.D. Ky. 1917).
100. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1920).
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try the only two capital civil crimes-murder and rape-when thosecrimes were committed in peace-time within the United States. 101
The 1950 Uniform Code
Although the 1916 articles were extensively revised after World
War 1,102 the provisions of those articles relating to jurisdiction over
civil crimes remained substantially unchanged 103 until the enactment
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950.104 The Code, with its
attempt to approximate the rules and procedure applicable in the
federal courts, was rightly hailed as a significant advance in the
administration of military justice. 05 Nevertheless, the Code did elide
the one remaining limitation on court-martial jurisdiction over civil
crimes, for it provided, in effect, that in peace-time courts-martial
could try and impose the death penalty with respect to murder and
rape committed within the United States. 106 In view of the previously
expressed reluctance on the part of the military to undertake the
punishment of capital civil crimes, it is indeed astonishing that at the
prolonged congressional hearings on the Uniform Code, only one voice
107
seems to have been raised in objection to this novel provision.
V. THE PREsENT PRACTICE
At the present time, courts-martial and civil courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction over crimes committed by servicemen within the
United States. 0 8 That is, where a soldier's conduct constitutes at the
same time an offense against military discipline, punishable by courtmartial, and a crime cognizable in a civil tribunal, the court whose
jurisdiction first attaches is generally entitled to proceed. 0 9 And it is
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Articles of War, 1916, art. 92, 39 Stat. 664.
See Act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. 787.
41 Stat. 803, 805.
10 U.S.C. § 551 (1958).
See, e.g., Brosman, Uniform Code of Military Justice, Some Problems
and Opportunities, 25 OKLA. B.A.J. 1605 (1954); Landman, One Year of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice; A Report of Progress, 4 STAw. L. Rv. 491
(1952); White, Has the Uniform Code of Military Justice Improved the

Court-MartialSystem, 28 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 19 (1953).

106. UCMJ, arts. 118, 120, 10 U.S.C. §§ 712, 714 (1958).
107. Statement of Richard H. Wels, Chairman, Special Committee on Mili-

tary Justice of the New York County Lawyers' Association, Hearings on the

Uniform Code of Military Justice Before the House Subcommittee of the
Committee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 644 (1949).
108. Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 (1920); Franklin v. United States, 216
U.S. 559 (1910); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Ex parte
Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1881); 6 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 413 (1854).
109. E.g., Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1881). The two jurisdictions also
have the alternative of deciding between themselves which one of them shall
proceed first. E.g., Ex parte Dunn, 250 Fed. 871, 873 (D. Mass. 1918); Op.
J.A.G. of November 11, 1911, DIG. Ops. J.A.G., 1912-40, § 432(2). At the
present time the matter of delivery of a military offender to the civilian
authorities is left to regulation. UCMJ, art. 14(a), 10 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1958).
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no defense in the first proceeding that the other jurisdiction could
have tried the accused." 0 Moreover, the plea of a previous conviction
or acquittal by court-martial does not constitute a defense to subsequent state court proceedings."' This result stems from the constitutional dogma that the state and federal governments are separate
"sovereigns" and, therefore, each is entitled to punish the luckless
offender whose single act happens to transgress a law enacted by
each "sovereign."" 2 On the other hand, since courts-martial and
federal courts are said to derive their powers from the same authority,
i.e., Congress, a serviceman who has been tried by one of them cannot
thereafter be tried by the other for the same offense." 3 Thus, if a
serviceman commits an assault on a military or other reservation
over which the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction, he
could be tried and convicted either by the federal courts or by courtmartial, but not by both.
Dual state-federal jurisdiction over civil crimes committed by members of the armed forces has resulted in a situation that does little
credit to the orderly administration of criminal justice. The rule is, to
put it bluntly, that whichever authority first catches the accused is
entitled to the first crack at him. It does not matter whether the
particular offense had a substantial impact upon military discipline
or whether the victim was a civilian rather than another member of
the armed forces. Indeed, the only protection afforded the serviceman
is the right to have an action against him removed to the federal
district court in a case where the offense was committed under color
of office." 4 In other respects, however, neither Congress nor the
110. Franklin v. United States, 216 U.S. 559 (1910); Ex parte Mason, 105
U.S. 696, 699 (1881).
111. E.g., Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878) (conviction);
United States v. Cashiel, 25 Fed. Cas. 318 (No. 14,744) (D. Md. 1863) (acquittal). Conversely, prior trial in a state court does not bar subsequent trial
by court-martial. In 'e Stubbs, 133 Fed. 1012 (C.C. Wash. 1905) (acquittal).
112. Abbate v. United States, .359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. United States,
359 U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
113. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); United States v. Block,
262 Fed. 205 (D. Ind. 1920). See United States v. Bayer, 156 F.2d 964, 960
(2d. Cir. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 331 U.S. 532, rehearing denied, 332
U.S. 785 (1947); Crane, Double Jeopardy and Courts-Martial,3 MINN. L. Rav.
181 (1919).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (Supp. V, 1958) provides that:
"A civil or criminal prosecution in a court of a State of the United
States against a member of the armed forces of the United States on
account of an act done under color of his office or status, or in respect to
which he claims any right, title, or authority under a law of the United
States respecting the armed forces thereof .

.

. may at any time before

the trial or final hearing thereof be removed for trial into the district
court of the United States .... "
Prior to the enactment of this statutory authority, the lower federal courts
upheld the accused's right to obtain his discharge from state custody in those
cases where the offense was committed in carrying out a lawful order of his
military superiors. Lima v. Lawler, 63 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Va. 1945); Brown v.
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Supreme Court has seen fit to protect the serviceman from the shabby
consequences that can flow from the actual exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction.
The Departments of Justice and Defense have found it desirable to
establish ground rules for determining the forum for trying a serviceman charged with a civil offense in violation of both military and
federal law." 5 In general, these rules, which were established by
agreement between the Departments in 1955, give to the military
department concerned the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting offenses committed by persons subject to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and involving as victims only those persons or their
civilian dependents residing on the military installation in question." 6
The military departments may also investigate and prosecute "extraordinary" cases involving special factors relating to the administration
and discipline of the armed forces. Offenses committed outside the
military installation or involving persons not subject to the Uniform
Code are normally to be investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and prosecuted in the civil courts.
It is, in a sense, ironic that the executive branch alone has given
some recognition to the desirability of trying certain kinds of offenses
in accordance with established civil procedures, including trial by
jury. Furthermore, by relinquishing the right to have these offenses
tried by court-martial, the Defense Department seems implicitly to
have conceded that good order and military discipline do not require
the full exercise of the jurisdiction over civil offenses which Congress
granted to courts-martial under the Uniform Code.
VI. THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF CLAUSE 14

History is not the controlling, much less the sole, guide to constitutional interpretation."n An inquiry directed exclusively to the question of whether or not the Constitutional Convention believed that
courts-martial should exercise jurisdiction over civil crimes misses
the mark by a wide margin; the solutions reached in one century may
Cain, 56 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1944); In re Wulzen, 235 Fed. 362 (Ohio 1916);
In re Fair, 100 Fed. 149 (C.C. Neb. 1900).
115. Army Reg. 22-160, Oct. 7, 1955, implementing Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of Justice and Defense Relating to the
Prosecution of Crimes Over Which the Two Departments Have Concurrent
Jurisdiction,signed July 19, 1955.
116. Tbid.
117. The Supreme Court has, however, stated that "the interpretation of
the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact
that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law,
and are to be read in the light of its history." Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S.
465, 478 (1888). See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1942). For an
extended discussion of the importance of history in the constitutional area,
see Goebel, Constitutional History and Law, 38 COLUm. L. REv. 555 (1938).
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not even be relevant in another." 8 Yet the momentous issues which
wracked seventeenth century England have more than mere historical
interest. The principle of civilian supremacy remains firmly embedded in our. concept of democratic govenment;" 9 and trial by
jury, as the Supreme Court has recently reminded us, is a right not
lightly to be disregarded. 20
The principal constitutional problem here is whether clause 14,
either alone or in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause,
gives to Congress the power to entrust courts-martial with jurisdiction
over both capital and non-capital civil crimes (i.e., crimes having no
substantial adverse effect upon the maintenance of good order and
military discipline) committed by servicemen in time of peace within
the United States. The historical material which we have outlined
shows that clause 14 was not inserted in the Constitution with the
objective of granting to Congress plenary authority to prescribe
procedures for trying and punishing members of the armed forces.
It also seems reasonably clear that the Constitutional Convention did
not contemplate that Congress would actually permit courts-martial
to try and punish such civil crimes. That does not, in itself, require
the conclusion that Congress was never to have the power to delegate
to courts-martial jurisdiction over such civil crimes; constitutional
interpretation has not been thought to depend upon the insight of
the Constitution's drafters into all the ways in which power granted
might subsequently be used.121 Moreover, as Mr. Justice Harlan suggested in his concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert, the Constitutional
118. For example, Mr. Justice Hughes states that "when we are dealing

with the words of the Constitution ... we must realize that [the framers] ...

have called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters ....

The vast body of

law which has been developed was unknown to the fathers, but it is believed
to have preserved the essential content and the spirit of the Constitution."
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 443 (1933).
119. Thus, Mr. Justice Field stated that the "military should always be
kept in subjection to the laws of the country to which it belongs, and ...
he is no friend to the Republic who advocates the contrary. The established
principle of every free people is, that the law shall alone govern; and to it the
military must always yield." Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 169 (1879). The
English have long been proud of "the very singular subjection in which the
military is kept in regard to the civil power." 2 DE LOLMt, THE ENGLISH
CoNSTrrOrioN 981 (1838). See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955); Duncan v. Kahamoku,
327 U.S. 304 (1946); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 128 (1866).
120. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14-19 (1955).
121. In 1816, Justice Story observed: "The Constitution unavoidably deals
in general language. It did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing
this great charter of our liberties, to provide for minute specifications of its
powers, or to declare the means by which these powers should be carried into
execution.... Hence, its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to
the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its powers, as its own
wisdom, and the public interests, should require." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816).
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Convention was probably less concerned with limiting congressional
power than it was with precluding the executive branch from later
laying claim to various powers which were once embraced within
the royal prerogative. 22
The contemporary understanding of court-martial jurisdiction is
nonetheless important for the light it sheds on the proper construction
of the words used in clause 14 itself. To begin with, it will be observed
that the terminology of clause 14 is far different from that used in
clause 10 authorizing Congress to "define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas." Clause 14 does not, for example, speak of definition and punishment of crimes committed by
members of the land and naval forces. Congress is instead given
power to make "rules," not to define and punish "Crimes." Furthermore, those "Rules" must be "for" a specified purpose-the "Government and Regulation" of the land and naval forces. The fair import
of clause 14 is, therefore, not to authorize general criminal jurisdiction over servicemen, but to make rules prescribing punishment for
offenses having some special relationship to the armed forces.12 As
we have pointed out, this interpretation is not only justified by the
evolution of the court-martial in England, but is also consistent with
the articles of war in force between 1776 and 1863 and with their
construction by the American military services and the Attorney
General.m
The necessary and proper clause does not lend constitutional support to the peace-time exercise by courts-martial of jurisdiction over
civil crimes. The most that clause would seem to authorize is the
trial and punishment of those crimes which, although known to the
common law, also adversely affect good order and military discipline
in the armed forces. Thus, the use of the court-martial to try and to
punish a barracks thief can hardly meet with serious constitutional
objection. On the other hand, consider this hypothetical case: Private
Jones, a young draftee who is stationed in California, is on leave in
New York City where he has been living at his parents' home. A
few hours after a violent family quarrel, Private Jones deliberately
122. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 68 (1957).
123. But see Mr. Justice Clark's dictum in Kinsella v. Singleton, supra note
6, that "the power to 'make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval forces' bears no limitation as to offenses. The power there
granted includes not only the creation of offenses but the fixing of the punishment therefor." 361 U.S. at 246.
Mr. Justice Whittaker, however, was careful to qualify the power to make
"Rules" to those which are "necessary and proper." 28 U.S.L. W=EK at 4086.
He also referred to "the practical necessities and the lack of alternatives"
with respect to overseas court-martial jurisdiction over civilian employees.
Ibid. Of course, neither is a consideration applicable to the problem discussed
in this article.

124. See notes 56-59 supra.
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stabs his sleeping father with a kitchen knife and kills him. Jones is
then charged with premeditated murder-a capital crime-and
brought to trial before a general court-martial. Here is a crime whose
only substantial relationship to the military service lies in the fact
that Private Jones happened at the time to be, a soldier. Apart from
the Army's desire to rid itself of persons who have committed serious
offenses-which can easily be done without resort to court-martial
proceedings,"-Jones's crime plainly does not have any substantial
bearing on the maintenance of good order and military discipline, nor
can it reasonably be suggested that amenability to trial by courtmartial is likely to have any deterrent effect with respect to an act
of this kind. May it fairly be argued, then, that court-martial jurisdiction over Jones can be based on "Rules for the Government and
Regulation" of the armed forces and that Congress may, in consequence, deprive Private Jones of civil procedures merely because he
was serving "in" the Army?
It is true that for more than forty years courts-martial have, apparently without objection, exercised jurisdiction over non-capital civil
127
offenses. 126 Acquiescence is not, however, equivalent to approval;
and the fact remains that the Supreme Court has never decided the
basic constitutional issue. Furthermore, as we indicated at the outset,
the peace-time armed forces can no longer be regarded as a professional elite living according to their own customs in near-isolation
from the civilian world. 128 Judicial attitudes developed under the
far different conditions then prevailing are almost totally irrelevant
125. Army Reg. 635-206, April 8, 1959, provides for the administrative
separation of enlisted personnel who have committed an act of misconduct.
Normally, an undesirable discharge will be effected pursuant to the approved
findings of a board of officers where the soldier involved has been convicted
by a civil court (domestic or foreign).
126. See text at note 104 supra.
127. Cf. Mr. Justice Rutledge's statement concerning supposed congressional
acquiescence in Supreme Court action: "Notwithstanding recent tendency,
the idea cannot always be accepted that Congress, by remaining silent and
taking no affirmative action in repudiation, gives approval to judicial misconstruction of its enactments.... But it would be going even farther beyond
reason and common experience to maintain . . . that in legislation any more

than in other affairs silence or nonaction always is acquiescence equivalent
to action." Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22 (1946). See Girouard
v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
128. Thus the authorized military strength of the United States in 1789
was only 840. 1 AwoRicAN STATE PAPERS MILITARY AFAms 6 (Lowrie &
Clarke 1832). In 1792 the authorized total was only 5,120. Id. at 40. At
the outset of the War of 1812 the American Army consisted of less than 7,000
men. THE R.O.T.C. MANUAL FOR ESSENTIALLY MI=ITARY ScHooLs (7th ed. 1942).
At the outbreak of the Civil War the Army only had a strength of some
16,000, and these were scattered all over the country and had the primary
task of guarding lines of travel against the Indians. Throughout the period
from the close of the Civil War to the Spanish American War, the Army was
employed chiefly as a constabulary and a police force. Id. at 656. For a
general discussion of our previous conception of the army's role, see Hum.KOPER, THE MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS

OF THE UNITED STATES (1915).
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to the standing army of today.

VII. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE. REFORm
Apart from the constitutional issues, the problems considered above
deserve searching legislative study. Lacking any realistic prospect of
elimination of cold war pressures, the continued maintenance in
peace-time of a sizable military establishment consisting in large
part of civilian soldiers should be recognized as calling for discriminating adjustment of traditional civil processes to justifiable claims
of military necessity. Given these conditions, there seems little excuse
for granting wider court-martial jurisdiction than is reasonably required by demands of good order and military discipline.129 As Mr.
Justice Black remarked in Reid v. Covert, the "business" of soldiers is
to fight and to prepare to fight. 130 Trial by court-martial of military
personnel in time of peace within the United States for civil crimes
contributes little to the needs of this "business."
A decision to revest in the civil courts jurisdiction over civil crimes
could be implemented in several ways. It would, of course, be possible to permit the state courts to punish all such crimes committed
within their borders. 131 In fact, at the present time state courts have
jurisdiction concurrent with courts-martial over most of these
129. 'Tree countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals
to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops in active service." United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955).
130. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957).
131. H.R. 3455, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). This draft bill (supported by
the American Legion), among other things, would amend article 14(a) of the
Uniform Code (relating to delivery of offenders to the civil authorities) as
follows:
Section 814, Article 14, Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities. (a)
A member of the armed forces accused of an offense against the laws of the
United States or of a State ... shall, except in time of war, be delivered,
upon proper request, to the civil authority for trial. No person shall, except
in time of war, be tried for any offense committed within the United
States punishable by sections 918-932 (articles 118-132), inclusive, if, prior
to arraignment before a court-martial, the civil authority having jurisdiction to try him for a substantially similar offense under the laws of the
United States or of a State ... requests delivery of that person for trial.
It would seem, however, that peacetime limitation of military jurisdiction
requires an approach different from that found in H.R. 3455. Many localities
lack the funds and facilities necessary to handle the numerous felony trials
which can result from the location in their midst of a large military installation. Sectional feelings with regard to certain types of crime may also deny
accused persons a fair trial in the local courts. Jurisdictional difficulties will
almost certainly arise when the crime is committed on a reservation subject
solely to the control of the United States. Finally, the proposed revision of
article 14 leaves to judicial construction the question of what constitutes a
"substantially similar offense," as well as the question of whether an accused
may be tried by court-martial after a proper demand for delivery to civil
authorities has been made and the accused returned without trial to military
control.
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crimes.132 An alternative, and much preferable, solution would be to
grant to the federal district courts primary jurisdiction over civil
crimes committed by servicemen. Congress should adopt legislation defining each of the crimes punishable by the district courts.
Where the accused has committed one of those crimes, he should have
the right to demand trial in the federal district court in the district
where the crime was committed, subject to removal to some other district if required to assure a fair trial. It will ordinarily be quite easy
for a federal district court to determine, at a preliminary hearing,
whether the offense is.civil in nature or bears a substantial relationship
to maintenance of military discipline. Moreover, conviction or acquittal
after trial by court-martial or in the federal courts should preclude
subsequent criminal proceedings in any state court for substantially
the same crime. Legislation of this kind would not only guarantee to
servicemen accused of essentially civil crimes the full benefits of the
Bill of Rights and ordinary civil procedures, but it would also protect
them from the distasteful consequences of the notion of "dual sovereignty" as applied to the administration of criminal justice. Such
protection is peculiarly appropriate in the case of servicemen whose
subjection to both federal and state law arose only because of the
direct or indirect compulsion of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act-a federal statute. The least that can be asked of Congress is that it afford protection to those whom it has swept within
the orbit of federal laws.
Having in mind that the Supreme Court has already erected constitutional bulwarks to protect both former servicemen and civilian
dependents who have voluntarily accompanied servicemen abroad,
it seems strange indeed that Congress and the courts should quietly
acquiesce in depriving the serviceman himself of basic constitutional
rights in cases where overriding military needs cannot be plainly
demonstrated. The time is ripe for appropriate legislative response
to the novel problems created by the existence of a large standing
armed force.
132. See text supra notes 108-12.

